From: M. Taylor Saotome-Westlake Date: Sun, 19 Apr 2020 23:45:12 +0000 (-0700) Subject: Human Diversity: 63 genders, purple invaders, fine-grained stereotypes X-Git-Url: http://232903.hjopswx29.asia/source?a=commitdiff_plain;h=a02b9fc87b5ba3e97917b47900dba2917f3f2099;p=Ultimately_Untrue_Thought.git Human Diversity: 63 genders, purple invaders, fine-grained stereotypes --- diff --git a/content/2019/the-social-construction-of-reality-and-the-sheer-goddamned-pointlessness-of-reason.md b/content/2019/the-social-construction-of-reality-and-the-sheer-goddamned-pointlessness-of-reason.md index e92daf5..73ee656 100644 --- a/content/2019/the-social-construction-of-reality-and-the-sheer-goddamned-pointlessness-of-reason.md +++ b/content/2019/the-social-construction-of-reality-and-the-sheer-goddamned-pointlessness-of-reason.md @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ But the ancestors, in choosing the words to carve _their_ reality at the joints, That incentive lasted about forty years. After its crowning victory in _Obergefell v. Hodges_, the [Blue](https://slatestarcodex.com/2014/09/30/i-can-tolerate-anything-except-the-outgroup/) [Egregore's](https://www.ribbonfarm.com/2015/05/07/weaponized-sacredness/) LGBT activist machinery wasn't about to sit idle or quietly disband, so instead adapted itself to the obvious next growth channel of absorbing new neurotype-demographics into the "T": specifically, capturing a larger fraction of the ~5% (?) of men with intense AGP (whose analogues in a previous generation would have been [furtive, closeted crossdressers](https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15859369)), and the ~5% (?) of [girls](https://www.parentsofrogdkids.com/) on the losing end of [female intrasexual competition](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Female_intrasexual_competition) (whose analogues in a previous generation would have been anorexic). -Sculpting "trans" into an interest group large enough to serve as a pawn (well, [bishop](https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2008/06/ol9-how-to-uninstall-cathedral/)) under the Blue Egregore's control required the LGBT sub-egregore to re-collapse the sex/gender distinction (pried apart at such painstaking cost by its feminist cousins two generations earlier)—in the _other_ direction: sex, having already been split into "sex" and "gender" (f.k.a. gender _roles_ f.k.a. _sex_ roles), must now give way entirely to the latter. In [Hoffman and Taylor's account of the precession of simulacra (following Baudrillard)](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/excerpts-from-a-larger-discussion-about-simulacra/), medical transsexualism of the 20th-century West was a mixture of simulacrum levels 1 (to the extent that hormones and surgery constitute a successful [sex change](http://lesswrong.com/lw/xe/changing_emotions/)) and 2 (to the extent that they don't, and transitioning consists of [lying](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/blatant-lies-best-kind/) about one's sex). +Sculpting "trans" into an interest group large enough to serve as a pawn (well, [bishop](https://www.unqualified-reservations.org/2008/06/ol9-how-to-uninstall-cathedral/)) under the Blue Egregore's control required the LGBT sub-egregore to re-collapse the sex/gender distinction (pried apart at such painstaking cost by its feminist cousins two generations earlier)—in the _other_ direction: sex, having already been split into "sex" and "gender" (f.k.a. gender _roles_ f.k.a. _sex_ roles), must now give way entirely to the latter. In [Hoffman and Taylor's account of the precession of simulacra (following Baudrillard)](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/excerpts-from-a-larger-discussion-about-simulacra/), medical transsexualism of the 20th-century West was a mixture of simulacrum levels 1 (to the extent that hormones and surgery constitute a successful [sex change](http://lesswrong.com/lw/xe/changing_emotions/)) and 2 (to the extent that they don't, and transitioning consists of [lying](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/blatant-lies-best-kind/) about one's sex). In contrast, post-_Obergefell_ gender theory belongs to simulacrum level 3: rather than having a non-circular truth condition, "gender" is just a free-floating Schelling point, a [role](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/AqbWna2S85pFTsHH4/the-intelligent-social-web) or [costume](https://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/PurelyAestheticGender) to be [symbolically identified](https://thezvi.wordpress.com/2015/06/30/the-thing-and-the-symbolic-representation-of-the-thing/) with, meaning no more (and no less) what one can predict that others will predict that others will predict ... _&c._ that it means. Biological sex would continue to be a decision-relevant variable if it were cognitively available (summarizing a variety of physical differences, who can get pregnant, various game-theoretic social consequences of who can get pregnant, [personality differences to the tune of](https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0029265) [Mahanalobis _D_](https://marcodgdotnet.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/delgiudice_2013_is-d_valid_ep.pdf) ≈ 2.7, _&c._)—but _no_ culture can provide all the concepts that _would be_ decision-relevant _if available_. Definitionally, you don't know what you're missing. ["The limits of my language are the limits of my world."](https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein) Some claim to have [_seen through_](https://www.gwern.net/docs/philo/2012-sistery-tryingtoseethrough.html) to a world beneath the world, but without a way to _share_ what they've allegedly seen, to bring it within mutually-reinforcing consensus of the intersubjective, who's not to say that they only dreamed it? diff --git a/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md b/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md index ae0834a..54af271 100644 --- a/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md +++ b/content/drafts/book-review-human-diversity.md @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Murray also addresses the issue of aggregating effect sizes—something [I've be Subsequent chapers address sex differences in personality, cognition, interests, and the brain. It turns out that women are more warm, empathetic, æsthetically discerning, and cooperative than men are! They're also more into the Conventional, Artistic, and Social dimensions of the [Holland occupational-interests model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holland_Codes). -You might think that this is all due to socialization, but then it's hard to explain why the same differences show up in different cultures—and why (counterintuitively) the differences seem _larger_ in richer, more feminist countries. (Although as evolutionary anthropologist [William Buckner](https://traditionsofconflict.com/) points out in [his](https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/1228124441944584192) [social-media](https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/1228860328483491840) [criticism](https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/1228947493309698050) of _Human Diversity_, [W.E.I.R.D.](https://www.apa.org/monitor/2010/05/weird) samples from different countries aren't capturing the full range of human cultures.) You might think that the "larger differences in rich countries" result is an artifact: maybe people in less-feminist countries implicitly make within-sex comparisons when answering personality questions (_e.g._, "I'm aggressive _for a woman_") whereas people in more-feminist countries use a less sexist standard of comparison, construing ratings as compared to people-in-general. Murray points out that this explanation still posits the existence of large sex differences in rich countries (while explaining away the unexpected cross-cultural difference-in-differences). Another possibility is that wealth increases sexual dimorphism _in general_, including, _e.g._, height and blood pressure, not just in personality. +You might think that this is all due to socialization, but then it's hard to explain why the same differences show up in different cultures—and why (counterintuitively) the differences seem _larger_ in richer, more feminist countries. (Although as evolutionary anthropologist [William Buckner](https://traditionsofconflict.com/) points out in [his](https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/1228124441944584192) [social-media](https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/1228860328483491840) [criticism](https://twitter.com/Evolving_Moloch/status/1228947493309698050) of _Human Diversity_, [W.E.I.R.D.](https://www.apa.org/monitor/2010/05/weird) samples from different countries aren't capturing the full range of human cultures.) You might think that the "larger differences in rich countries" result is an artifact: maybe people in less-feminist countries implicitly make within-sex comparisons when answering personality questions (_e.g._, "I'm competitive _for a woman_") whereas people in more-feminist countries use a less sexist standard of comparison, construing ratings as compared to people-in-general. Murray points out that this explanation still posits the existence of large sex differences in rich countries (while explaining away the unexpected cross-cultural difference-in-differences). Another possibility is that wealth increases sexual dimorphism _in general_, including, _e.g._, height and blood pressure, not just in personality. [TODO: tie into farmer/forager theory: http://www.overcomingbias.com/2010/10/divide-forager-v-farmer.html ] @@ -110,7 +110,9 @@ If the blank slate doctrine isn't _scientifically_ compelling—it's not somethi And that's where the blank slate doctrine absolutely _shines_—it's the [Schelling point](/2019/Oct/self-identity-is-a-schelling-point/#schelling-point) for preventing group conflicts! (A [_Schelling point_](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yJfBzcDL9fBHJfZ6P/nash-equilibria-and-schelling-points) is a choice that's salient as [a focus for mutual expectations](/2019/Dec/more-schelling/): what I think that you think that I think ... _&c._ we'll choose.) If you admit that there could differences between groups, you open up the questions of in what exact traits and of what exact magnitude, which people have an incentive to lie about to divert resources and power to their group by [establishing unfair conventions and then misrepresenting those contingent bargaining equilibria](/2020/Jan/book-review-the-origins-of-unfairness/) as some "inevitable" natural order. -If you're afraid of purported answers being used as a pretext for oppression, you might hope to _make the question un-askable_. Can't oppress people on the basis of race if race _doesn't exist_! Denying the existence of sex is harder—which doesn't stop people from occasionally trying. But the taboo mostly only applies to _psychological_ trait differences, because those are a [sensitive subject](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/judgment-punishment-and-the-information-suppression-field/)—and easier to motivatedly _see what you want to see_: whereas things like height or skin tone can be directly seen and uncontroversially measured with well-understood physical instruments (like a meterstick or digital photo pixel values), psychological assessments are _much_ more complicated and therefore hard to detach from the eye of the beholder. (If I describe Mary as "warm, compassionate, and agreeable", the words mean _something_ in the sense that they change what experiences you anticipate—if you believed my report, you would be _surprised_ if Mary were to kick your dog and make fun of your nose job—but the things that they mean are a high-level statistical signal in behavior for which we [don't have a simple measurement device](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/edEXi4SpkXfvaX42j/schelling-categories-and-simple-membership-tests) like a meterstick to appeal to if you and I don't trust each other's character assessments of Mary.) +If you're afraid of purported answers being used as a pretext for oppression, you might hope to _make the question un-askable_. Can't oppress people on the basis of race if race _doesn't exist_! Denying the existence of sex is harder—which doesn't stop people from occasionally trying. "I realize I am writing in an LGBT era when some argue that 63 distinct genders have been identified," Murray notes at the beginning of Appendix 2. But this oblique acerbity fails to pass the [Ideological Turing Test](https://www.econlib.org/archives/2011/06/the_ideological.html). The language of _has been identified_ suggests an attempt at scientific taxonomy—a project, which I share with Murray, of fitting categories to describe a preexisting objective reality. But I don't think the people making 63-item typeahead select "Gender" fields for websites are thinking in such terms to begin with. The specific number 63 [is ridiculous and can't exist](/2019/Dec/on-the-argumentative-form-super-proton-things-tend-to-come-in-varieties/); it might as well be, and often is, a fill-in-the-blank free text field. Despite being insanely evil (where I mean the adjective literally rather than as a generic intensifier—evil in a way that is of or related to insanity), I must acknowledge this is at least good game theory. If you don't trust taxonomists to be acting in good faith—if you think we're trying to bulldoze the territory to fit a preconcieved map—then [destroying the language](/2019/Aug/the-social-construction-of-reality-and-the-sheer-goddamned-pointlessness-of-reason/#re-collapse-the-sex-gender-distinction) that would be used to be build oppressive maps is a smart move. + +The taboo mostly only applies to _psychological_ trait differences, because those are a [sensitive subject](http://benjaminrosshoffman.com/judgment-punishment-and-the-information-suppression-field/)—and easier to motivatedly _see what you want to see_: whereas things like height or skin tone can be directly seen and uncontroversially measured with well-understood physical instruments (like a meterstick or digital photo pixel values), psychological assessments are _much_ more complicated and therefore hard to detach from the eye of the beholder. (If I describe Mary as "warm, compassionate, and agreeable", the words mean _something_ in the sense that they change what experiences you anticipate—if you believed my report, you would be _surprised_ if Mary were to kick your dog and make fun of your nose job—but the things that they mean are a high-level statistical signal in behavior for which we [don't have a simple measurement device](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/edEXi4SpkXfvaX42j/schelling-categories-and-simple-membership-tests) like a meterstick to appeal to if you and I don't trust each other's character assessments of Mary.) Notice how the "not allowing sex and race differences in psychological traits to appear on shared maps is the Schelling point for resistance to sex- and race-based oppression" actually gives us an _explanation_ for _why_ one might reasonably have a sense that there are dread doors that we must not open. Undermining the "everyone is Actually Equal" Schelling point could [catalyze a preference cascade](https://www.reddit.com/r/slatestarcodex/comments/8q8p6n/culture_war_roundup_for_june_11/e0mxwe9/)—a [slide down the slippery slope to the the next Schelling point](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Kbm6QnJv9dgWsPHQP/schelling-fences-on-slippery-slopes), which might be a lot worse than the _status quo_ on the "amount of rape and genocide" metric, even if it does slightly better on "estimating heritability coefficients." The orthodoxy isn't just being dumb for no reason. In analogy, Galileo and Darwin weren't _trying_ to undermine Christianity—they had much more interesting things to think about—but religious authorities were _right_ to fear heliocentrism and evolution: if the prevailing coordination equilibrium depends on lies, then telling the truth _is_ a threat and it _is_ disloyal. And if the prevailing coordination equilibrium is basically _good_, then you can see why purported truth-tellers striking at the heart of the faith might be believed to be evil. @@ -148,7 +150,7 @@ I don't want to be complicit with hatred or oppression. I want to stay loyal to We can't talk about group differences, for fear that anyone arguing that differences exist is just trying to shore up oppression. But ... structural oppression and actual group differences can _both exist at the same time_. They're not contradicting each other! Like, the fact that men are physically stronger than women (on average, but the effect size is enormous, like _d_ ≈ 2.6 for total muscle mass) is _not unrelated_ to the persistence of patriarchy! (The ability to _credibly threaten_ to physically overpower someone, [gives the more powerful party a bargaining advantage](/2020/Jan/book-review-the-origins-of-unfairness/#threatpoints-and-bargaining), even if the threat is typically unrealized.) That doesn't mean patriarchy is good; to think so would be to commit the [naturalistic fallacy](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/#NatFal) of [attempting to derive an _ought_ from an _is_](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io). No one would say that famine and plague are good just because they, too, are subject to scientific explanation. This is pretty obvious, really? But similarly, genetically-mediated differences in cognitive repertoires between ancestral populations are probably going to be _part_ of the explanation for _why_ we see the particular forms of inequality and oppression that we do, just as a brute fact of history devoid of any particular moral significance, like how part of the explanation for why European conquest of the Americas happened earlier and went smoother for the invaders than the colonization of Africa had to do with the disease burden going the other way (Native Americans were particularly vulnerable to smallpox, but Europeans were particularly vulnerable to malaria). -Again—obviously—_is_ does not imply _ought_. [TODO: explain that you should imagine yourself in the inferior group] +Again—obviously—_is_ does not imply _ought_. In deference to the historicially well-justified egalitarian fear that such hypotheses will primarily be abused by bad actors to portray their own group as "superior", I find it helpful to dwell on science-fictional scenarios in which the boot of history is one's own neck. If a race of lavender humans from an alternate dimension were to come through a wormhole and invade our Earth and cruelly subjugate _your_ people, you would probably be pretty angry, and maybe join a paramilitary group aimed at overthrowing lavender supremacy and re-instanting civil rights. The possibility of a partially-biological _explanation_ for _why_ the purple bastards discovered wormhole generators when we didn't (maybe they have _d_ ≈ 1.8 on us in visuospatial skills, enabling their population to be first to "roll" a lucky genius who could discover the wormhole field equations), would not make the conquest somehow justified. I don't know how to build a better world, but it seems like there are quite _general_ grounds on which we should expect that it would be helpful to be able to _talk_ about social problems in the language of cause and effect, with the austere objectivity of an engineering discipline. If you want to build a bridge (that will actually stay up), you need to study the ["the careful textbooks \[that\] measure \[...\] the load, the shock, the pressure \[that\] material can bear."](http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_strain.htm) If you want to build a just Society (that will actually stay up), you need a discipline of Actual Social Science that can publish textbooks, and to get _that_, you need the ability to _talk_ about basic facts about human existence and make simple logical and statistical inferences between them. @@ -172,7 +174,7 @@ Give people photographs of various women and men and ask them to judge how tall Once you understand at a _technical_ level that probabilistic reasoning about demographic features is both epistemically justified, _and_ implicitly implemented as part of the way your brain processes information _anyway_, then a moral theory that forbids this starts to look less compelling? Of course, statistical discrimination on demographic features is only epistemically justified to exactly the extent that it helps _get the right answer_. Renormalized-egalitarians can still be properly outraged about the monstrous tragedies where I have moral property P but I _can't prove it to you_, so you instead guess _incorrectly_ that I don't just because other people who look like me mostly don't, and you don't have any better information to go on—or tragedies in which a feedback loop between predictions and social norms creates or amplifies group differences that wouldn't exist under some other social equilibrium. -Nelson _et al._ also found that when the people in the photographs were pictured sitting down, then judgements of height depended much more on sex than when the photo-subjects were standing. This too makes Bayesian sense: if it's harder to tell how tall an individual is when they're sitting down, you rely more on your demographic prior. In order to reduce injustice to people who are an outlier for their group, one could argue that there's a moral imperative to seek out interventions to get more fine-grained information about individuals, so that we don't need to rely on the coarse, vague information embodied in demographic stereotypes. The _moral spirit_ of egalitarian–individualism mostly survives in our efforts to [hug the query](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/2jp98zdLo898qExrr/hug-the-query) and get [specific information](/2017/Nov/interlude-x/) with which to discriminate amongst individuals. (And _discriminate_—[to distinguish, to make distinctions](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/discriminate)—is the correct word.) If you care about someone's height, it is _better_ to precisely measure it using a meterstick than to just look at them standing up, and it is better to look at them standing up than to look at them sitting down. If you care about someone's skills as potential employee, it is _better_ to give them a work-sample test that assesses the specific skills that you're interested in, than it is to rely on a general IQ test, and it's _far_ better to use an IQ test than to use mere stereotypes. If our means of measuring individuals aren't reliable or cheap enough, such that we still end up using prior information from immutable demographic categories, that's a problem of grave moral seriousness—but in light of the [_mathematical laws_](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/eY45uCCX7DdwJ4Jha/no-one-can-exempt-you-from-rationality-s-laws) governing reasoning under uncertainty, it's a problem that realistically needs to be solved with _better tests_ and _better signals_, not by _pretending not to have a prior_. +Nelson _et al._ also found that when the people in the photographs were pictured sitting down, then judgements of height depended much more on sex than when the photo-subjects were standing. This too makes Bayesian sense: if it's harder to tell how tall an individual is when they're sitting down, you rely more on your demographic prior. In order to reduce injustice to people who are an outlier for their group, one could argue that there's a moral imperative to seek out interventions to get more fine-grained information about individuals, so that we don't need to rely on the coarse, vague information embodied in demographic stereotypes. The _moral spirit_ of egalitarian–individualism mostly survives in our efforts to [hug the query](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/2jp98zdLo898qExrr/hug-the-query) and get [specific information](/2017/Nov/interlude-x/) with which to discriminate amongst individuals. (And _discriminate_—[to distinguish, to make distinctions](https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/discriminate)—is the correct word.) If you care about someone's height, it is _better_ to precisely measure it using a meterstick than to just look at them standing up, and it is better to look at them standing up than to look at them sitting down. If you care about someone's skills as potential employee, it is _better_ to give them a work-sample test that assesses the specific skills that you're interested in, than it is to rely on a general IQ test, and it's _far_ better to use an IQ test than to use mere stereotypes. If our means of measuring individuals aren't reliable or cheap enough, such that we still end up using prior information from immutable demographic categories, that's a problem of grave moral seriousness—but in light of the [_mathematical laws_](https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/eY45uCCX7DdwJ4Jha/no-one-can-exempt-you-from-rationality-s-laws) governing reasoning under uncertainty, it's a problem that realistically needs to be solved with _better tests_ and _better signals_, not by _pretending not to have a prior_. This could take the form of _finer-grained_ stereotypes. If someone says of me, "Taylor Saotome-Westlake? Oh, he's a _man_, you know what _they're_ like," I would be offended—I mean, I would if I still believed that getting offended ever helps with anything. (It _never helps_.) I'm _not_ like typical men, I _don't like_ typical men, and I don't want to be confused with them. But if someone says, "Taylor Saotome-Westlake? Oh, he's one of those IQ 130, [mid-to-low Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, high Openness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Five_personality_traits), left-libertarian American Jewish atheist autogynephilic male computer programmers; you know what _they're_ like," my response is to nod and say, "Yeah, pretty much." I'm not _exactly_ like the others, but I don't mind being confused with them. The other place where I think Murray is hiding the ball (even from himself) is in his discussion of the value of cognitive abilities. Murray writes— diff --git a/content/drafts/stereotypes-models-and-cognition.md b/content/drafts/stereotypes-models-and-cognition.md deleted file mode 100644 index 8ba03fe..0000000 --- a/content/drafts/stereotypes-models-and-cognition.md +++ /dev/null @@ -1,11 +0,0 @@ -Title: Stereotypes, Models, and Cognition -Date: 2020-01-01 -Category: commentary -Tags: epistemology -Status: draft - -fine-grained stereotypes - -If someone says of me, "Taylor Saotome-Westlake? Oh, he's a _man_, you know what _they're_ like," I would be offended—I mean, I would if I still believed that getting offended ever helps with anything. (It _never helps_.) I'm _not_ like typical men, I _don't like_ typical men, and I don't want to be confused with them. - -But if someone says, "Taylor Saotome-Westlake? Oh, he's one of those IQ 130, [mid-to-low Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, high Openness](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Five_personality_traits), left-libertarian American Jewish atheist autogynephilic male computer programmers; you know what _they're_ like," my response is to nod and say, "Yeah, pretty much." I'm not _exactly_ like the others, but I don't mind being confused with them. diff --git a/notes/human-diversity-notes.md b/notes/human-diversity-notes.md index cbb9d26..bef387c 100644 --- a/notes/human-diversity-notes.md +++ b/notes/human-diversity-notes.md @@ -4,51 +4,40 @@ TODO— _cognitive repetioires_—the phrase being Murray's device for shaving nine syllables off "personality, abilities, and social behavior" - 2. "genders have been identified" - -"I realize I am writing in an LGBT era when some argue that 63 distinct genders have been identified," Murray writes at the beginning of Appendix 2. But this oblique acerbity fails to pass the [Ideological Turing Test](https://www.econlib.org/archives/2011/06/the_ideological.html). The language of _has been identified_ suggests an attempt at scientific taxonomy—a project, which I share with Murray, of fitting categories to describe a preexisting objective reality. I don't think the people making 63-item typeahead select "Gender" fields for websites are thinking in such terms to begin with. The specific number 63 [is ridiculous and can't exist](/2019/Dec/on-the-argumentative-form-super-proton-things-tend-to-come-in-varieties/); it might as well be, and often is, a fill-in-the-blank free text field. - -If you don't trust taxonomists to be acting in good faith—if you think they're trying to bulldoze the territory to fit a preconcieved map— - - +--- 3. Loury— https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/GSz8SrKFfW7fJK2wN/relevance-norms-or-gricean-implicature-queers-the-decoupling -As economist Glenn Loury points out in _The Anatomy of Racial Inequality_, cognitive abilities decline with age, and yet we don't see a moral panic about the consequences of an aging workforce, because older people are construed as an "us"—our mothers and fathers—rather than an outgroup. +As economist Glenn C. Loury points out in _The Anatomy of Racial Inequality_, cognitive abilities decline with age, and yet we don't see a moral panic about the consequences of an aging workforce, because older people are construed as an "us"—our mothers and fathers—rather than an outgroup. - 4. * Embryo selection looks _really important_—and the recent Dawkins brouhaha says we can't even talk about that; and the ways I'm worried about eugenics being misused aren't even on the radar - - 5. stages of HBD + 9. mention "Coming Apart" thesis -The author of the _Xenosystems_ blog mischievously posits five stages of human biodiversity + 14. individual-level differences are less threatening because people don't perceive them as forming a coalition (Murray disagrees with this!) -http://www.xenosystems.net/five-stages-of-hbd/ +----- -> Stage-4 (Depression): "Who could possibly have imagined that reality was so evil?" + 4. * Embryo selection looks _really important_—and the recent Dawkins brouhaha says we can't even talk about that; and the ways I'm worried about eugenics being misused aren't even on the radar -> Stage-5 (Acceptance): "Blank slate liberalism really has been a mountain of dishonest garbage, hasn’t it? Guess it’s time for it to die ..." + 5. stages of HBD +The author of the _Xenosystems_ blog mischievously posits [five stages of knowledge human biodiversity](http://www.xenosystems.net/five-stages-of-hbd/) (in analogy to the famous, albeit [reportedly lacking in empirical support](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/K%C3%BCbler-Ross_model), five-stage Kübler-Ross model of grief), culminating in Stage 4: Depression ("Who could possibly have imagined that reality was so evil?") and Stage 5: Acceptance ("Blank slate liberalism really has been a mountain of dishonest garbage, hasn't it? Guess it's time for it to die ..."). 6. I have an excuse; telling the truth is a Schelling point (https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/tCwresAuSvk867rzH/speaking-truth-to-power-is-a-schelling-point)—and finish +------- + 7. more examples of sex difference effect sizes, elaborate on "big" doesn't mean anything 8. tie into farmer/forager - 9. mention "Coming Apart" thesis +---- 10. Jensen sources of variation 11. colorism - 12. explain imagine self in inferior group - - 13. work in individual-level stereotypes - - 14. individual-level differences are less threatening because people don't perceive them as forming a coalition (Murray disagrees with this!) - ------